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Feature Article 
COMPETITION OR CONTROL?: TOE GREEN PAPER ON BUILDING SOCIETIES 
Paul Draper 
Department of Economics 
University of Strathclyde 
The r ecen t ly published Green Paper 
outlining a new framework for building 
s o c i e t i e s p rov ides an i n t e r e s t i n g 
opportunity to examine the Government's 
attitudes towards competition in financial 
markets while revealing clearly i t s 
ambivalence about free markets. Lack of 
confidence in the competitive process 
finds expression in a desire to regulate. 
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e a p p a r e n t 
unpredictability which on occasion results 
from p e r m i t t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s and 
institutions to select through the market 
the most appropriate solution to the i r 
financial requirements, regulation and i t s 
consequent restriction on choice provides 
apparent cer ta inty to the l eg i s l a to r . 
Outcomes may be p r e d i c t e d w i t h 
considerable accuracy and any deficiencies 
that a r i se in the course of time can be 
corrected by introducing new legislation. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y r e g u l a t i o n may a lso 
introduce new anomalies and d i s to r t ions 
i n to the f i n a n c i a l system reducing 
efficiency and growth. 
regulations governing building soc ie t i e s . 
If implemented, societies would be allowed a 
l i t t l e more f l e x i b i l i t y whilst largely 
retaining their existing structure. 
There seems l i t t l e to commend in such an 
approach. The housing finance market over 
at l eas t the l a s t decade has shown, and 
continues to exhibi t , a s t r ik ing lack of 
compet i t ion . The Green Paper i t s e l f 
documents t h i s and whils t i t s suggestions 
wi l l help to improve competition they do 
not go far enough. 
According to the Green Paper bu i ld ing 
societies 
(1) offer a safe home for investors money 
and 
(2) finance the growth of home ownership, 
Any improvement in the compet i t ive 
environment i s to be welcomed and to this 
extent the Green Paper must be applauded. 
However, i t i s unfor tuna te t h a t the 
progress along the compet i t ive path 
embodied in that document i s so l imited. 
In the absence of a c l e a r l y defined 
theoretical model of financial markets the 
Paper f a i l s to ask many important 
questions relevant to competition in such 
markets and the consequent r o l e and 
p o s i t i o n of the bu i ld ing s o c i e t i e s . 
Impl ic i t in the Green Paper i s the idea 
that housing finance is different from 
other types of finance. This supposition 
l eads to t he recommendat ion t h a t 
l eg i s l a t ive changes should be limited to 
l i t t l e more than tinkering with the 
two services which the Government, and 
indeed most of us, find worthwhile. I t i s 
clearly desirable that investors should be 
a b l e to f ind s a f e i n v e s t m e n t s and 
i n d i v i d u a l s able to secure funds for 
purchasing the i r houses. The interesting 
question re la tes not to the provision of 
these services but whether the building 
soc ie t ies are the only or most appropriate 
means of achieving these objectives. 
The competitive ideal i s a market in which 
t h e s u r p l u s funds of s a v e r s a r e 
redis t r ibuted to those with investment 
opportunit ies. Funds should be available 
to any investment that can secure returns 
greater than the appropriate (risk adjusted) 
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market r a t e of r e t u r n s i n c e such 
investments wi l l increase the stock of 
wealth. Conversely investments tha t 
offer returns lower than the market ra te 
are undesirable since they reduce the 
stock of wealth. Such investments should 
find i t difficult to at tract funding. 
Of course t h i s i s a simplified picture 
which ignores the problems posed by 
social benefits and costs. Nevertheless 
i t can s t i l l provide important ins ights 
into the workings of financial markets and 
suggest appropriate policies to encourage 
economic efficiency. I t suggests, for 
example, that unless there are consequent 
clear social benefits no investment should 
be subsidised by securing funding a t 
interest rates below those prevailing (for 
the same level of r isk) in f inancial 
markets generally. Such subsidies distort 
the t o t a l p a t t e r n of investment by 
stimulating investment in less profitable 
areas of the economy. I t i s equally 
undesirable to set i n t e r e s t r a t e s above 
the appropriate market level since th i s 
wi l l reduce the t o t a l investment in the 
affected area below the social optimum. 
Simple as this idea is can we be sure that 
i t i s not being violated in UK financial 
markets with consequent misallocation of 
resources? We cannot. I t i s apparent 
t h a t the housing market , where the 
existence of the i n t e r e s t r a t e ca r t e l i s 
r e c o g n i s e d in t h e Green Paper as 
i n h i b i t i n g " the f r ee play of market 
forces," provides instances of j u s t such 
distortions and whilst i t recommends the 
removal of this particular impediment to 
competition other examples abound. 
The absence of competition is particularly 
apparent in the market for large mortages. 
The Green Paper recognises the d ivers i ty 
in the s t ructure of mortgage in t e re s t 
rates and notes that most societies charge 
a premium for larger mortgages. This has 
"however tended to cost them market share 
among larger borrowers, as the banks have 
been able to take advantage of the 
administrat ive economies of scale in a 
snmaller number of larger loans and of the 
good c r e d i t s t and ing of many l a r g e r 
borrowers". In o ther words, in a 
competitive market large loans should have 
a lower interest rate than small loans and 
yet building societies continue to follow 
pol ic ies that d i s t o r t the a l locat ion of 
f unds , a c l e a r example of l a c k of 
competitive pressure. 
A second example, t h i s t ime of a new 
distortion that the Green Paper proposes to 
introduce and of the Government's lack of 
faith in the market process, i s provided by 
the proposed r e s t r i c t i o n on s o c i e t i e s 
permitted holdings of liquid assets. 
No more than one third of to t a l assets may 
be held in t h i s form in order to prevent 
soc ie t ies investing predominantly in g i l t 
edged and other money market instruments. 
In a competitive market the societies would 
only hold such instruments if they offered a 
higher return for the risk assumed than was 
available in the housing market. If such a 
situation persisted the mortgage rate should 
be allowed to r i s e to res tore equilibrium. 
Resorting to regulation to force societies 
to invest in housing ar t i f icial ly depresses 
the mortgage rate and introduces distortions 
into the structure of interest rates. 
Believers in the competitive process may go 
further and question the implicit assumption 
of t h e Green Paper t h a t e x i s t i n g 
arrangements should continue - a housing 
market dominated by one predominant type of 
i n s t i t u t i o n , the building society, with 
small incursions from insurance companies 
and banks to provide a semblance of 
competition. The Green Paper assumes that 
there i s a need for a financial institution 
directed a t one segment of the f inancial 
market. The competitive ideal views the 
financial system as one large market which 
finances projects and investments of any 
sort and where the important characteristic 
of an investment i s not i t s nature but the 
reward i t offers for the risk assumed. In 
t h i s framework housing i s j u s t one of many 
p o s s i b l e u s e r s of funds and i t i s 
undesirable that i t should be insulated from 
the forces acting in the market as a whole. 
I t i s a matter of indifference whether 
investors invest in housing or other forms 
of investment so long as they pay the 
appropriate ra te of i n t e re s t , j u s t as our 
concern i s not from whom they borrow but 
rather the t o t a l ava i l ab i l i ty of funds. 
In financial terms there is nothing special 
about housing finance and in consequence 
i n s t i t u t i o n s specia l is ing in t h i s sector 
should be t reated in the same manner as 
other financial institutions. There is no 
obvious explanation why building societies 
should be regulated in a s ignif icant ly 
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different fashion from clearing banks, for 
example. Regulation aiming to protect 
savers and investors from deliberate fraud 
and mismanagement should not provide a 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for r e s t r i c t i o n s which 
severely impede the competitive process. 
There i s also no compelling reason why 
building societies should be restricted as 
the Green Paper recommends to being mutual 
institutions. Other financial sectors 
such as insurance, encompass both mutual 
and profit making institutions. 
From a f i n a n c i a l pe r spec t ive i t i s 
difficult to see any conclusive reason for 
t rea t ing borrowing for housing different 
from borrowing for other purposes. To 
argue that housing is an important social 
objective and therefore demands special 
funding f a c i l i t i e s i s unreasonable when 
the poor, and sometimes desperately needy, 
are forced to borrow (if they can) at very 
high rates from other credit institutions 
for e q u a l l y d e s i r a b l e p u r p o s e s . 
Accepting t h a t the growth of home 
ownership is a worthwhile objective does 
not imply that the housing finance market 
should be insulated from other financial 
markets . While i t i s important to 
guarantee the avai labil i ty of loans a t 
current market r isk adjusted ra tes i t i s 
equally important not to provide mortgage 
funds at ra tes below the current market 
level since this will distort the flow of 
resources. The question to be answered 
i s whether t h e r e a re any aspec t s of 
housing finance that suggest that t h i s 
sector of the f inancial market should be 
t r e a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y . Recent UK 
experience i s an inadequate guide since 
the banks have had to compete on an 
unequal footing with the societies in the 
provision of housing finance. Experience 
elsewhere suggests that banks and other 
similar insti tutions are equally capable 
of meeting individual requirements. 
This i s not of course a plea to remove 
building soc ie t ies from the ranks of 
financial institutions but rather to allow 
any financial i n s t i t u t ion interested in 
providing housing finance to do so and 
more important ly to f ree bu i ld ing 
socie t ies from the f e t t e r s that prevent 
them competing in other segments of the 
f i n a n c i a l market. Even-handedness 
requires not ju s t competition in the 
housing market but in a l l sectors of 
f i n a n c i a l m a r k e t s . If b u i l d i n g 
societies, through their extensive retai l 
network, are able to offer consumers a 
greater variety or more cost effective 
services than other i n s t i t u t i ons then they 
should be able to do so just as institutions 
wishing to exploi t economies of scale and 
special ise in a par t icular sector of the 
market should be free to do so. The Green 
Paper does suggest some liberalising of the 
present constraints on the societies but is 
reluctant to embrace a truly competitive 
framework. Apologists of that document may 
argue that the desire to provide a safe 
investment for savers constrains the extent 
of possible changes but th i s assumes that 
a l te rna t ive investments are not available 
and t h a t f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are 
necessarily risky. The record of the 
c l ea r i ng banks or some of the o ther 
institutions clearly indicates the f a l s i ty 
of that proposition. 
Amongst the new functions which the Green 
Paper suggests that socie t ies should be 
allowed to provide are a more complete range 
of personal banking and money transmission 
services to their members. The Paper goes 
so far as to say "Financial i n s t i t u t i ons 
should be able to compete on equal terms in 
this field". I t i s far from apparent why 
th i s par t icular f inancial intermediation 
function should be singled out. The money 
t r ansmiss ion system i s l i k e l y to be 
expensive to operate and a considerable 
burden to the soc ie t ies resul t ing in a 
further r i s e in the r a t io of management 
expenses to asse ts which the paper notes 
doubled in the past decade and has only 
recently shown any sign of fa l l ing . In 
i t s e l f the costs associated with extra 
services are not necessarily bad. The 
provision of addi t ional f a c i l i t i e s may 
reduce an individual's own adjustment costs 
- i t may be more convenient and cheaper for 
an individual to deal with one i n s t i t u t i on 
rather than several - so that the provision 
of ex t ra s e r v i c e s provides very rea l 
bene f i t s to consumers. What i s of 
par t icular in te res t i s why the Green Paper 
should perce ive the f ree ing of the 
r e s t r i c t i ons on the money transmission 
mechanism as of particular importance. 
Possibly the most important manner in which 
the Government could foster competition in 
financial markets i s in the market for 
loans. Regrettably, i t i s here that the 
regulatory habit finds greatest expression. 
A distinction is proposed in the Green Paper 
between d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of a s s e t s . 
Building societies would be required to hold 
at least 90% of their assets in mortgages on 
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res iden t ia l property and no more than 5% 
of their assets in unsecured lending, the 
ownership of land and property and equity 
investment. I t i s not at a l l apparent 
why the Green Paper should adopt 90% as 
i t s l imi t on r e s iden t i a l property.More 
appropriate surely than an arbitrary limit 
would be to lay down g u i d e l i n e s and 
prohibit societies from rapid changes from 
those suggested. This would allow 
societies to change over time and provide 
much greater f l e x i b i l i t y to evolve in a 
manner a p p r o p r i a t e to an i nd iv idua l 
society's requirements. 
The motivation for this division of assets 
i s the l audab le aim of p r o t e c t i n g 
investors and savers by r e s t r i c t i n g the 
ability of the societies to take on risky 
asse ts . In the process, however, they 
also severely res t r ic t the ability of the 
societies to compete with the banks. The 
r e s t r i c t i on on unsecured lending, with a 
suggested l i m i t of £5,000 to any one 
individual, i s unnecessarily r e s t r i c t i v e . 
No well managed i n s t i t u t i o n i s going to 
lend to individuals who have l i t t l e chance 
of repayment. Commercial prudence 
requires lending only to those of good 
f i n a n c i a l s t and ing w h i l s t the r i s k 
reduction provided by many borrowers in 
the case of unsecured lending suggests 
that many of the r e s t r i c t i o n s on asse ts 
are unnecessary. I t i s interesting that 
the document suggests t igh t control over 
assets and yet argues, almost as an aside, 
t h a t the s o c i e t i e s may innovate and 
develop new fund raising instruments - a 
process that can be extremely risky as 
Merrill Lynch has been recently finding to 
i t s cost. 
The last matter we shall address concerns 
the control and accountabil i ty of the 
soc ie t ies . The Green Paper se t s out 
three objectives with regard to improving 
the accountability of the societies: (a) 
improving the flow of information to 
interested investor, (b) giving members a 
greater opportunity to raise points at the 
AGM and (c) making e l e c t i o n s f a i r e r . 
While these are a l l worthwhile the Paper 
may be c r i t i c i s e d for not going fa r 
enough. Although extra information i s to 
be given to the Registry, for reasons of 
commercial s ens i t i v i t y i t wi l l not be 
generally avai lable . There seems no 
reason why t h i s data should not be 
published after a lapse of a few years to 
allow any interested party to consider, in 
depth, the long term management of a 
society. 
More importantly, the Green Paper accepts 
with l i t t l e discussion the mutual form of 
the societies although this sharpens many of 
the problems of control . There cannot be 
any d isc ip l ine exerted by the market since 
the soc ie t i es are not companies and hence 
not quoted. Few if any analysts monitor 
the i r progress, quite unlike the s i tua t ion 
for commercial companies. This suggests 
that the information that societies provide 
to t h e i r i n v e s t o r s must in pa r t be 
comparat ive and e v a l u a t i v e . Reports 
emphasising t h e i r management expenses, 
advert is ing costs and 'p ro f i t s ' together 
with comparisons with other soc ie t ies and 
perhaps other i n s t i t u t i o n s , would allow 
members to be be t te r informed about t he i r 
investments. Such information must be 
coupled w i t h an open ing up of t h e 
directorships of the s o c i e t i e s . Self 
pe rpe tua t i ng o l i g a r c h i e s are c l e a r l y 
undes i r ab l e but how are these to be 
prevented? One poss ib i l i ty would be for 
the Government to maintain, much as i t does 
for Quangos, a l i s t of the 'great and the 
good', qual i f ied individuals prepared to 
serve as outside directors on the boards of 
a society for a s t r i c t l y l imited period. 
I t i s important to escape from a s i tua t ion 
in which friends, acquaintances and business 
partners of the exis t ing board find t h e i r 
way onto that board. In the absence of 
shareholder power i t i s necessary to provide 
s ta tutory mechanisms for ensuring genuine 
outside influence on the soc ie t ies . The 
vague possibility of being elected, implicit 
in the Green Paper, i s not suff ic ient . I t 
would be difficult, even with 'even handed' 
e lec t ions , for candidates not endorsed by 
the board to be selected. 
The Green Paper con ta ins many other 
suggestions worthy of comment. Enough has 
been said however to indicate the l imited 
progress that the document makes. Moves to 
l e t the winds of compet i t ion i n t o the 
housing finance markets are to be welcomed 
but much more could be usefully done with 
benefits to a l l . 
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